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Belonging in America:
How to Understand Same-Sex Marriage
Robert A. Burt*
The idea of “belonging” in America is not what it once was. For
most of our national life, it was possible to identify a social group of
“insiders’” who were sharply and self-consciously different from, and
enjoyed a higher status than, “outsiders.” The very existence of this
“power elite” was often viewed as inconsistent with the ethos of
equality supposedly enshrined in our founding national document, the
Declaration of Independence. But like it or not, and inconsistent or not
with our professed national creed, the existence of a high status elite—
a White Anglo-Saxon Protestant male Establishment (hereinafter
“WASP”)—was unmistakable.1
This WASP male Establishment did not simply rule over American society. The WASP male Establishment was American society.
There was a single unified conception of the American mainstream,
and the WASPs were it. They owned America and the non-WASPs
were, at most, resident aliens or tenants at will.
This social imagery was given powerful, poignant expression by
an African-American attorney arguing in the Supreme Court against
the constitutionality of court-enforced racial restrictive covenants in
Shelley v. Kraemer.2 “Now I’ve finished my legal argument,” he said,
“but I want to say this before I sit down. In this Court, this house of
the law, the Negro today stands outside, and he knocks on the door,
over and over again. He knocks on the door and cries out, ‘Let me in,
let me in, for I too have helped build this house.”3
The door to the American house has indeed opened since the
Court decided Shelley, but the single-family house that had been behind the door in 1948 is no longer there. It is not simply that the postWorld War II idealized domestic relationship of a married, heterosexual couple with 2.4 children has lost its exclusive hold on American
*

Alexander M. Bickel Professor of Law, Yale University.
1
See E. DIGBY BALTZELL, THE PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT: ARISTOCRACY AND CASTE
IN AMERICA (1964).
2
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
3
NORMAN SILBER, WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: THE LIFE OF PHILIP ELMAN 193 (Ann
Arbor: Univ. Michigan Press, 2004).
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society.4 More importantly, the social image of the American community is no longer monolithic, no longer a single national family.
There are still white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant men living in America, but during the last half-century the WASP male Establishment has
virtually disappeared as a ruling force in the country. In 1960, when I
graduated from college, it was beyond belief that fifty years later, the
United States would be governed by a black President, a Catholic
Vice-President, and—perhaps most startling of all—a Supreme Court
with not even one Protestant Justice, but comprised entirely of six
Catholics and three Jews (including three women and one black man).
This bit of data strongly suggests not only that the WASP male
dominance has disappeared from American society but, more fundamentally, that the very idea of a single dominant American identity
has substantially weakened, if not entirely vanished. But, like the grin
of the Cheshire Cat, the idea of an American mainstream—of a unified
socially inclusive identity—lingers on.
This shadow of an idea plays an important role in the contemporary debate about state recognition of same-sex marriage. Proponents
of this recognition continue to insist that there is a mainstream—a core
sense of communal identity, of “belonging”—from which same-sex
couples have been hurtfully and wrongfully excluded. These proponents see themselves as storming the bastions of heteronormativity,
demanding to be let inside. Ironically, this belief in the existence of a
heterosexual mainstream is also shared by many of the opponents of
same-sex marriage, who see themselves as defenders of the traditional
but endangered bastion of normality.
If, however, we understand that the old embodiment of the American mainstream—the solid phalanx of the WASP male Establishment—not only has dissolved but that nothing comparable has taken its
place, then this struggle between the advocates and opponents of legalized same-sex marriage takes on a very different character. To borrow Matthew Arnold’s formulation from the mid-nineteenth century,
both advocates and opponents of same-sex marriage find themselves
“wandering between two worlds, one dead / The other powerless to be
born.”5 Put in more prosaic terms, advocates for same-sex marriage
are demanding access to a mainstream identity which is no longer
available as a solid cultural construct and the opponents are not so
4

See Number of People in a Family, available at http://hypertextbook.com/facts/2006/
StaceyJohnson.shtml; ANDREW J. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND: THE STATE OF
MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY IN AMERIC TODAY (2009).
5
Matthew Arnold, Stanzas from the Grand Chartreuse, lines 85-86 (1855), available at
http://rpo.library.utoronto.ca/poem/106.html.
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much confident in asserting their own status as “insiders” as they are
struggling to bolster the already weakened “insider” social status in
American society.
By demanding access to the supposed mainstream, the proponents
of same-sex marriage can identify a goal through which their sense of
exclusion and marginalization might be remedied. At the same time,
the opponents of same-sex marriage insist that there is an American
mainstream constituted in part by restriction of marital status to
mixed-sex couples; these opponents can thereby deny their concern
about themselves being marginalized, homeless, because of the dissolution of the very idea of the American mainstream. The battle has
such intensity, even ferocity, because both sides suspect—though they
may not want to acknowledge this suspicion, even to themselves—that
no real victory is available to either of them, that the battle for inclusion in an American mainstream is lost before it is begun because the
prize, the promised Holy Grail, no longer exists.
Between these two antagonists—the same-sex couples demanding
admission to the honorific status of marriage and the traditionalists
fervently resisting this demand—there is thus a deeper, if ironic,
common bond. This bond is the shared, though unacknowledged suspicion that there no longer is a centered social identity in American
life and the shared, though unacknowledged hunger for the resurrection of this cultural ideal: a shared longing for “belonging.”
We can see this hunger for a spiritual sense of belonging in the
changing terms of the debate over the status of same-sex couples. For
the past fifty years at least, the rallying cry for those outside conventional sexual preferences has been the “right to privacy”: a claim that
the sexual practices of consenting adults in the privacy of their own
home was no one’s business but their own.6 The principle targets for
this right on behalf of same-sex couples were state laws criminalizing
so-called homosexual sodomy. In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court by a
five-to-four vote in Bowers v. Hardwick,7 declined the opportunity to
overturn these laws. In 2003, the Supreme Court reversed this ruling,
going so far as to say that the 1986 holding was “not correct when it
was decided, and it is not correct today.” In this 2003 ruling, Lawrence v. Texas, the Court’s opinion by Justice Kennedy invoked the
right to privacy, but it did not rigorously restrict itself to this ground
for overturning Bowers.8 Instead, the Court explicitly drew a connec6
See MARTHA NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 68-77 (2010).
7
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
8
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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tion between the spiritual and emotional significance of mixed-sex and
same-sex amorous relationships and then stated that the continued precedential force of Bowers “demeans the lives of homosexual persons.”9
Even so, the Lawrence opinion insisted that its ruling had no bearing on claims for same-sex marriage.10 Justice Scalia, in his customary
acerbic mode, mocked this obiter dicta: “Do not believe it,” he said.11
I do not believe, however, that the Court was acting disingenuously to
create a stalking horse for an ultimate ruling in favor of same-sex
marriage. In my view, the Court sensed the psychological and sociological thinness of the privacy principle and felt impelled to add some
rhetorical weight to it.
The privacy principle is too thin because it rests on the premise
that individuals can adequately define themselves without regard to
others’ approval or disapproval of them. The privacy principle diminishes individuals’ need for a sense of “belonging” almost to the vanishing point. The only social connection that the privacy principle
acknowledges is a shared communal commitment to leave one another
alone.12 One might imagine a community that defines itself entirely in
these terms; that the only conviction they share, the only principle that
unites them as a social group, is a commitment to leave one another
alone. But there is not much connectedness here. To call this assemblage of isolated individuals a “group” is more like an oxymoron than
a psychologically rooted depiction of a bonded community.
It may be, of course, that this wary distance from one another is
the best one might hope for in a deeply divided community, in a
community engaged in or on the verge of civil war. But the right to be
let alone is not relevant to the claim for state recognition of same-sex
marriage. To the contrary, advocates for same-sex marriage want the
state to be involved in their lives; they want the affirmative approval
that is conveyed by the state’s award of a license to marry. These advocates cast their claim in the vocabulary of constitutionally guaranteed equality. They maintain that withholding the benefit of marriage
from same-sex couples while awarding it to mixed-sex couples is an

9
10

Id. at 575.
Id. at 578 (“The present case . . . does not involve whether the government must give

formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”).
11
Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12
This was the core of Justice Louis Brandeis’ assertion in 1928 when he introduced the
idea of a right to privacy into our constitutional jurisprudence. It is, he said, “the right to be let
alone” which was “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men.” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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invidious discrimination.13 But these advocates are quite clear that they
are not primarily seeking financial advantages or other objectively
measurable state benefits that typically accompany marriage. “Civil
union,” which promises no discrimination between same-sex and
mixed-sex couples in provision of resources, is not enough to satisfy
same-sex marriage advocates. To borrow a familiar phrase, these advocates view equal financial resources with separately designated statuses as demeaning in the same way race segregation insulted AfricanAmericans; in marriage as in public schools, they say, “separate is inherently unequal.”
The campaigns for same-sex marriage and for the elimination of
racial segregation thus have a common underlying premise; but more
than this, these two campaigns share a common difficulty. The difficulty comes into sharpest focus when these two campaigns turn to the
courts to remedy the inequality that they perceive. Consider the problem in Brown v. Board of Education.14 If the Brown plaintiffs had
been content with obtaining equal financial resources while remaining
in race-segregated facilities, it is easy to imagine an adequate judicial
remedy: a court would have an objective measurement of equality and
could readily order state provision of equal resources based on that
measurement. But if, as the Brown plaintiffs maintained, the injury
was not the absence of identical financial resources but was more fundamentally the absence of respect for the equality of blacks and
whites, the possibility of remedy becomes much more complicated. In
particular, this dignitary injury cannot be remedied by imposing a
permanent state of martial law in the schoolhouse. Admitting AfricanAmerican children only when they are accompanied by armed militia
does not erase the insult, the demeaning separate treatment, at the core
of their prior exclusion from attending school with white children.
Perhaps forced racial integration can be understood as a temporary
way station toward full acknowledgment of the equal status of blacks
and whites. But unless the white segregationists ultimately acknowledge that they were wrong, unless the white population extends a
communal relationship based on their respect for blacks’ equal status,
the blacks’ claims for equality cannot be satisfied. The plaintiffs in
Brown, that is, didn’t want to be left alone. They wanted to be acknowledged partners in a shared communal relationship.
This is at its core the same remedy that advocates for same-sex
marriage are seeking. They seek more than equal financial advantages
available through “separate but equal” civil unions. But they also seek
13
14

Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 154-56.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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more than a judicial order commanding state officials to marry samesex couples in the same formal terms now provided for mixed-sex
couples. Advocates for same-sex marriage want more than a piece of
paper to pin on their lapels. They want this piece of paper to be more
than a formality. They want this certificate to have communal meaning. They want a communal acknowledgment—as Justice Kennedy put
it in Lawrence—that a same-sex relationship may serve the same goals
of “personal dignity and autonomy” that heterosexual couples pursue
in their relationships.15
In typical litigation, if a court finds that a complainant’s rights
have been violated, a coerced remedial order against the defendant
provides adequate redress. But equality claims do not fit this conventional model; the core of the plaintiffs’ complaint is that they have not
been treated or respected as an equal. If a judge agrees with this complaint, she cannot provide an effective remedy unless she persuades
the defendant to honor the plaintiffs as equals.
But how can this happen, especially in a case as polarized and
contentious as the current dispute about same-sex marriage? Here’s
my answer: if we understand the underlying stake in this dispute for
both parties in the way suggested at the beginning of this article, we
can see a way that the currently opposed parties could ultimately come
into a mutually respectful agreement. The antagonists are currently
framing their disagreement in mutually exclusive, polarized terms. If
we understand, however, that both parties—both the advocates for and
against same-sex marriage—are responding to the unaccustomed
weakness of the sense of belonging in the American community, we
can see a basis for ultimately leading both parties toward a true vindication of the equality ideal.
The very intensity of the opposition to same-sex marriage ironically confirms this understanding; the stakes feel so high to the opponents because they sense the fragility of their communal bonds generally and thereby elevate the importance of maintaining the
conventional boundaries of marriage, the special sense of belonging
which that status has traditionally implied. What the opponents fail to
see is that the advocates for same-sex marriage are investing that status with new strength on two scores. First of all, the advocates are not
asking for communal approval of their right to have sexual relations
with whomever they might want. The advocates are asking for an opportunity to bind themselves to a life-long commitment to a marital
partner—in Justice Kennedy’s words in Lawrence, “a personal bond
15

539 U.S. at 574.
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that is more enduring” than “intimate sexual conduct” as such.16 The
same-sex partners seek to obligate themselves to one another, to create
a strong bond of belonging between them. This faithfulness has always
been at the core of the marital status for mixed-sex couples, though in
recent years the existence of a permanent (or even a long-term) commitment has considerably frayed, and this weakening of the marital
bond has itself contributed to the diminution of the sense of belonging
in our culture generally.
Second, the advocates for same-sex marriage are asking to embed
their mutual commitment to one another in the context of a communal
recognition. They might have isolated themselves from the broader
community by simply living together and negotiating private contractual obligations between themselves (or seeking the financial advantages of the marriage status through civil unions, but without the solemnity of the mutual commitment that marriage has traditionally
represented). There is thus a two-fold commitment that same-sex
couples are seeking: a binding commitment to one another and a mutual commitment of the couple, a promise of faithfulness, to the community in which they live, notwithstanding the past indignities that this
community had heaped on them.
Fully understood, this effort by same-sex couples to achieve legally recognized marriage is an act of forgiveness, a wish to honor and
affiliate with the community that had once condemned them. If the
opponents of same-sex marriage could see the proponents’ claims in
this light, they might also see how their own deepest desires—for
binding commitment to their families and to their community—could
find new strength.
But how can the disputing parties be led from their polarized opposition to understand that they are seeking the common goal of a
strengthened community? In particular, is there a proper judicial role
in bringing about this reconciliation of opposed parties? Brown v.
Board of Education, the progenitor of all modern efforts to achieve
equality for scorned groups, most clearly reveals such a role.
Brown might look like a conventional case where the Court declared a winner (the African-Americans who had been denied equal
treatment) and ordered compliance by the loser (the white segregationists). In fact, the remedial process was much more complicated and
much more subtle in its effectuation than this conventional account. In
the first Brown decision, in 1954, the Court declared that the existing
segregated relationship subordinated African-Americans and denied
16

Id. at 567.
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them equal treatment and equal dignity. But the Court purposely withheld any dictate about what might constitute a future relationship of
recognized equality.17 In Brown II, decided in 1955, the Court persisted in this silence about the future, delphically announcing only that
the future must arrive “with all deliberate speed.”18
So far as the Court was concerned, the future began to arrive only
a decade later, when the nationally elected officials in Congress and
the Presidency overwhelming approved the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. These laws were enacted over the
continued opposition of the white segregationists in Congress and in
most Southern statehouses. But these Southerners were by now morally isolated—not simply or even primarily because the black-robed
Nine Old Men in Washington had ruled against them, but because the
national community now opposed them and embraced the cause of
African-Americans, who were increasingly vocal on their own behalf
in both the North and South. The Court set the stage for this public
activity by endorsing and giving high visibility to the grievances of
African-Americans; but the Court did not and could not order the voluntary recognition extended to African-Americans by nationally
elected officials.19
In choosing enforcement delay in Brown II, and then essentially
waiting for a decade until Congress had voluntarily stepped forward,
the Justices may have been motivated more by politics, more by a
practical sense of their institutional limitations, than by a wellformulated, principled judgment about the necessity and the proper
technique for soliciting popular ratification of the Court’s moral impulse. In retrospect, however, we can understand the Court’s path as
both innovative and deeply principled. The Court’s chosen path in effect recognized that the equality guarantee cannot be commanded but
must ultimately be based on voluntary, mutual consent. The Court did
not, however, deduce from this premise that there was no possible or
proper judicial role in pressing the opposed parties toward this mutual
respect.20 It recognized instead that judicial initiative is sometimes
constitutionally mandated in order to bring the parties into a relationship honoring the norm of equal protection of the laws.
During the past seven years, since the Court’s 2003 ruling in
17

See ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 275-85, 293 (1992).
Brown v. Bd of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
19
See Burt, supra note 17, at 294-303.
20
This was the non sequitur endorsed by the Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, that because
“social equality . . . must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other’s
merits, and a voluntary consent of individuals . . . the constitution of the United States cannot
put them upon the same plane.” 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
18
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Lawrence v. Texas, we can see this same judicially assisted process, a
demarcated pathway, toward a new communal relationship between
gays and straights (to use the colloquial referents). The Court took the
first step in Lawrence, with the same effect as the Court’s initial ruling in Brown I: that is, in both cases the Court ruled that the existing
relationship of subordination and disrespect by the majority toward the
minority was a violation of constitutional principle. But in both cases,
the Court did not specify what the terms of a new relationship might
be. Following Lawrence, as with Brown, the Court fell silent; and on
the issue of relations between gays and straights, the Supreme Court
still remains silent. As with Brown II, this may not seem to be a principled stance but instead the result of political calculation. In the postLawrence world, the calculation is less from the Court itself than from
reform-minded litigators who, sensing that their cause will not be welcomed in the Supreme Court, have turned instead to state courts and
to reliance on state constitutions. As a principled matter, in my judgment, this is exactly where the reform-minded enterprise should be.21
For consideration of the same-sex marriage issue, there are three
great virtues in principle for state rather than federal court adjudications. The first virtue is that any decision on the constitutional issue,
whether for or against the availability of same-sex marriage, does not
automatically apply to the entire United States. Any one state court is
a participant in an on-going deliberation among the states, with no one
court authorized to pronounce the final word in these deliberations,
unlike the U.S. Supreme Court’s conventional role in interpreting the
federal Constitution. The second virtue of state courts is the relative
ease with which their constitutions can be amended, compared to the
federal Constitution which is almost impossible to amend. Accordingly
any state court adjudication—whether for or against the availability of
21

A federal court ruling, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 921 (N.D. Cal., 2010),
endorsing the right to same-sex marriage under the United States Constitution is now pending in
the Ninth Circuit; as a matter of principle, however, the federal courts should refuse to adjudicate this constitutional issue. There are different doctrinal routes to this result: abstention and
ripeness are the most promising. See generally, ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 127-156 (1962). Federal courts could abstain from adjudication on the
ground that regulation of marital status is a matter primarily for state rather than national regulation and that federal courts should therefore defer to the extended deliberative processes in various state courts. See Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 127
S.Ct. 396 (2006) (approving federal court abstention to state courts in constitutional challenge to
gender-restrictive state marriage law); cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 599 (2002)
(“marriage, divorce and childrearing” are constitutionally protected “areas of state regulation.”)
The issue is not ripe on the ground that federal constitutional adjudication should be preceded by
state courts’ deliberations from which, over time, the federal courts can gauge the “accumulated
weight of opinion” as the Supreme Court has done in ultimately overturning the application of
the death penalty to minors or mentally retarded people. See In re Stanford, 537 U.S. 968
(2002); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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same-sex marriage—is not the last word within that state but is subject
to some form of popular reconsideration. It follows from this fact that
the failure of any effort to amend a state constitution in response to a
judicial ruling can be understood as popular acquiescence in, if not
explicit ratification of, that ruling.
The third great virtue of state court adjudications is their multiplicity. A federal court adjudication can move quickly from district court
to court of appeals to the Supreme Court, and that’s it. State court adjudications can go on and on, from one state to the next. The very existence of this iterative process continuously reenacts the dispute between the proponents and opponents of same-sex marriage. By dint of
its repetition from one state to the next—even where there are different results in the state court proceedings—the adversaries, and the
general public witnessing media coverage of the proceedings, keep
running into one another. From this repeated contact, the possibility
emerges that the adversaries and the public witnesses will see one
another in a new light: as recognizable human beings rather than moral abstractions or demonic forces.
Some groundwork can thus be laid for recognition on both sides of
the common bond that I have tried to identify in this article: the
shared wish to establish a sense of belonging in a mutually supportive
community; the shared feelings of vulnerability that arise from the
contemporary unraveling of the traditional sense of community; and
the shared hope to find a new sense of stability by entering into binding, communally recognized, long-term marital relationships. Judges
can set the stage for the possibility of this kind of mutual recognition.
It is, however, up to us—individually and as members of a community—to decide whether this possibility becomes an actuality.

